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ABSTRACT: This article deals with the international dimension of Argentine domestic policies by exploring one of 
the strategies of the conservative daily newspaper La Nación, between 1946 and 1950, in order to challenge Juan 
Perón’s hegemony. La Nación presented the Peronist regime as akin to the totalitarian regimes established under the 
Soviet Union’s vigilance. This is not surprising, but revealing the complex ideological mechanisms employed by La 
Nación in its strategy is a noteworthy endeavor. This work will provide a thorough exploration of the process through 
which La Nación shifted from its former opposition to Peronism, initially identified as a Nazi-Fascist movement, to 
a new articulation of the regime as a totalitarian one. To some extent this was not so different from the strategy that 
the United States’ (US) intellectual elites were carrying out in order to justify their struggle against a former ally in 
war as a continuation of purpose and not a rupture. Yet, the most interesting aspect of this evolution in the Argentine 
case is that it emerged in an autonomous way as a result of specific national and international phenomena. This 
shows that the characteristics of the early phase of the Cold War were shaped by transnational processes of conver-
gence rather than US hegemony alone.
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RESUMEN: La Nación, el peronismo y los orígenes de la Guerra fría en Argentina.- Este artículo analiza la dimen-
sión internacional de la política interna argentina explorando la estrategia del diario conservador La Nación, entre 
1946 y 1950 en su enfrentamiento con el gobierno de Juan Domingo Perón. La Nación presentó el régimen peronista 
como similar a los regímenes totalitarios establecidos bajo el control de la Unión Soviética. Esto no resulta sorpren-
dente, pero comprender los complejos mecanismos ideológicos empleados por La Nación en esta estrategia es un 
objetivo relevante de investigación. Este artículo ofrece un análisis detallado del proceso que permitió a La Nación 
transformar su descripción del peronismo como un movimiento nazi-fascista a otro totalitario. De alguna manera 
este proceso caminó en paralelo a la estrategia de los intelectuales estadounidenses para justificar el conflicto con un 
antiguo aliado como una continuación de los mismos objetivos de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y no como una ruptu-
ra. Sin embargo, lo más interesante es que en el caso argentino esta evolución surgió de manera autónoma como re-
sultado de condiciones específicas nacional y de una particular interpretación de los fenómenos internacionales. Esto 
muestra que algunas características de la Guerra Fría temprana fueron moldeadas por procesos transnacionales de 
convergencia y no por la hegemonía de los Estados Unidos en solitario.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Peronismo; totalitarismo; La Nación; ideología de la Guerra Fría
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INTRODUCTION
Argentine historiography has paid much attention to 
the impact of the Second World War on the domestic po-
litical scenario, showing how international events and na-
tional conflicts closely interacted. Yet historians have not 
fully explored the international dimensions of the domes-
tic conflicts (perhaps with the exception of economic is-
sues) that occurred after Juan Domingo Perón came to 
power in 1946. The literature dealing with international 
affairs and the literature dealing with domestic issues 
seem to diverge when addressing this period. It is true 
that links between the Argentine domestic and interna-
tional policies were more apparent during the Second 
World War than in any other period of modern Argentine 
history (Rapoport, 1988; Rapoport, 1989; Halperín Dong-
hi, 2003); however, this does not mean that foreign con-
nections vanished after the end of the war.1 This article 
analyzes the international dimension of domestic policies 
in Argentina under Perón by delving into the discursive 
strategies the liberal-conservative daily newspaper La 
Nación used when addressing the national government.
Historians have noticed the importance of the press in 
shaping Argentine public opinion. Argentina had achieved 
significant breakthroughs in the field of public education 
by the end of the nineteenth century and its levels of lit-
eracy at the time were comparable to the most developed 
countries in the world. In the 1940s, Argentine readers —
many of them coming from the growing middle class— 
could choose from among a wide variety of newspapers 
that presented radically different ideologies and writing 
styles. Internationally, the number of newspapers sold in 
the country was only comparable to figures for the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). Indeed, Ar-
gentina’s contemporaries were surprised by the dimen-
sion and impact the Argentine press had on the country 
(Ruiz Jiménez, 2006: 19-20).
La Nación was created by Bartolomé Mitre (an Ar-
gentine founding father) in 1870. As Ricardo Sidicaro 
(1993: 11) points out, La Nación has always been a news-
paper targeted toward the ideal Argentine ruling class and 
national policy-makers who seek to preserve specific lib-
eral doctrines. In the 1940s, struggling in a competitive 
milieu as far as the written media was concerned, La 
Nación was far from being the most popular paper in the 
country. However, alongside the doyen of the Argentine 
press, La Prensa, it had a reputation as a “serious” daily 
newspaper and acted as the conscience of Argentine 
elites.
Narratives about the Cold War in Latin America can 
generally be divided into two groups. First, there are nu-
merous historians who view the Cold War in Latin Amer-
ica as a continuation of US aspirations to establish its he-
gemony in the Western Hemisphere. According to this 
group the Cold War was a new avatar of US imperialism.2 
Second, the revisionist account presents the Cold War in 
Latin America as a reaction on the United States’ part to-
ward left-wing radicalism, guerrillas, and Soviet influ-
ence in the region. In this narrative, the Cuban Revolution 
marked a major turning point in the evolution of Latin 
America’s Cold War (Brands, 2010).
However, these two approaches miss some important 
points about the development of the Cold War (in Latin 
America in particular). Some ideological devices closely 
associated with the Cold War originated from local politi-
cal conflicts at an early date. Thus, La Nación resorted to 
analyzing the early phase of the Cold War as a vicarious 
way to portray Perón’s regime as akin to the totalitarian 
states that had been built in East European and were un-
der Soviet control.3 This is not surprising, but the way in 
which this strategy was displayed as well as the ideologi-
cal contributions derived from this operation deserve to 
be explored.
This article aims to understand the operation that al-
lowed La Nación to reconceptualize its old opposition to 
Peronism as a Nazi-fascist movement into a new descrip-
tion of Perón’s political regime as totalitarian. The opera-
tion was similar to the one carried out by US elites in or-
der to justify their fight against a former ally as a 
continuation of the Second World War enterprise (Wood, 
1985; Oren, 2003). The most revealing fact is that this de-
velopment was autonomous in Argentina, which shows 
that some important ideological tools of the Cold War 
were being forged in “peripheral” geographies. This no-
tion is related to what Anson Rabinbach has referred to as 
the “protean” characteristics of the term “totalitarianism.” 
That is, totalitarianism was a conceptual tool that helped 
smooth otherwise abrupt transitions from one constella-
tion of historical events to another by providing a frame-
work in which it was possible to accommodate and modi-
fy new political groupings (Rabinbach, 2006: 74, 87-88). 
Thus, in the Argentine case, the surprising emergence of 
Peronism altered traditional political alliances and chal-
lenged firmly rooted ideological premises. Totalitarian-
ism served a wide gamut of political actors, from con-
servatives to socialists, allowing them to make sense of 
their opposition to the new political force. Of course, to-
talitarianism did not mean the same thing for these politi-
cal actors. Equally important, totalitarianism as employed 
in Argentina did not simply replicate the discourse elabo-
rated in the United States but instead referred both to na-
tional and international ideological traditions and to cur-
rent world affairs, especially those in Western European. 
In truth, La Nación’s embrace of “Western values” of-
fered some significant nuanced agreements with the US 
position. The newspaper provided its readers with a pas-
sionate defense of the British Empire in a moment of im-
perial decline that might be interpreted as a nostalgic ele-
gy for the Argentine belle époque, which had been 
intimately connected with British hegemony.
This was part of La Nación’s conservative outlook 
vis-à-vis Perón and the Cold War. But at the same time, 
the newspaper elaborated its discussion on totalitarianism 
by drawing on liberal traditions. The concept of “liberal-
ism” in Argentina is linked to a right-wing position in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. However, since the 
nineteenth-century, Argentina’s liberals had perceived 
themselves to be promoters of a progressive ideology, 
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even if it was an authoritarian one (Halperín Donghi, 
2009). The use of the word totalitarian by Perón’s politi-
cal enemies was part of a global, or at least an Atlantic, 
convergence of ideas. Totalitarianism was a concept root-
ed in the international “progressive” traditions of the 
1920s and 1930s,4 and La Nación followed these tradi-
tions in order to strengthen its interpretation of Peronism 
as a totalitarian phenomenon. Both as a conservative and 
liberal movement, it is possible to observe a discursive 
convergence in different parts of the world that helped 
shape the ideological characteristics of the Cold War.
LA NACIÓN DURING PERÓN’S RULE
La Nación’s relationship with Perón and his govern-
ment evolved from an early moment of support, before 
the military man became a candidate for presidency in the 
February 1946 elections, to a longer period of conflict be-
tween 1945 and the end of 1951, which ultimately culmi-
nated in a concluding phase where the newspaper at-
tempted to reconcile with the government. Perón was one 
of the military men who achieved power after a coup 
d’état in June 1943. Step by step, from his position at the 
Department of Labor, Perón established his own political 
constituency and gained formidable influence within the 
regime. In mid-1944 he simultaneously held the positions 
of Vice President, Minister of War, and Secretary of 
Labor.5
Argentine Economic elites and the United States gov-
ernment never trusted Perón. The former considered his 
economic policy a threat while the latter saw in Perón a 
figure that had been too close to the Axis during the Second 
World War. Yet these attitudes did not initially alter La 
Nación’s positive image of Perón. Perón’s rise to power 
and the apparent possibility of Perón becoming an electoral 
candidate who could save the 1943 regime in the polls led 
La Nación to a profound shift in its position. The newspa-
per opposed Perón in the elections of February 1946 and 
endorsed a Democratic Union (Unión Democrática) candi-
date. La Nación, like many supporters of the Democratic 
Union, hoped that the wisdom of the Argentine voters 
would defeat the incumbent.6
After Perón’s unexpected victory, La Nación and oth-
er newspapers faced a tough government that was willing 
to suppress discordant voices. La Vanguardia, the social-
ist newspaper, was shut down by the government in 1947. 
In late 1949, the so-called Visca Committee of the Con-
gress began a direct attack on the media. For instance, the 
government controlled the account books of La Nación 
and other newspapers (Artinian, 2015; Sidicaro, 1993: 
209). In 1950, La Nación sharpened its critical attitude 
toward the government. In mid-1950, editorials and opin-
ion pieces in the paper paid more attention to domestic 
than international issues and criticism of the government 
became harsher and more obvious. The economic reces-
sion of 1949, the hardening of governmental positions, 
and Perón’s announcement that he would not be a candi-
date for reelection might have been interpreted by La 
Nación as a window of opportunity. Furthermore, by then 
the first phase of tension in the Cold War had seemingly 
vanished and international affairs were not considered as 
urgent as before, at least not until the beginnings of the 
Korean War.
In the following months the situation abruptly 
changed. In January 1951 a sour conflict occurred be-
tween La Prensa and the union of newspaper salesmen. 
The government ultimately decided to nationalize the pa-
per. Fear of a governmental intervention was a constant 
reality for La Nación (Sidicaro, 1993: 214-5). From the 
end of 1951, the paper took on a strategy of approaching 
the government. By 1952 the goal of reconciliation had 
become paramount, perhaps due to the newspaper’s po-
litical weakness or to the government’s shift in economic 
policy (Sidicaro, 1993: 218). Therefore, I focus here on 
the beginning years of the Cold War up until the Korean 
War, when La Nación took its most critical stance against 
the government.
Defining Totalitarianism
Perón’s enemies painted him as a “criollo imitation” 
of European fascist leaders. Thus, the Democratic Union 
pursued the strategy of presenting itself as a new popular 
front facing the advance of Nazism in Argentina. This im-
age of Peronism as the Argentine fascism remained for a 
long period in the political discourse. To the Socialist, 
Perón was an aberration, a winning fascist politician after 
the collapse of the Axis in Europe.7 Nonetheless, in the 
case of La Nación (and likely within the liberal and con-
servative milieus that constituted the bulk of its readers), 
the Peronist regime was increasingly characterized as to-
talitarian rather than fascist.
This does not mean that the word “totalitarian” ap-
peared at that moment. It had already been used to define 
fascist regimes during the Second World War (Sidicaro, 
1993: 181). During the international conflict, La Nación 
supported the Allies and criticized the Argentine military 
government established in 1943 for its defense of neutral-
ity. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was described by 
La Nación as the moment when “totalitarian aggression 
reached America” (LN, 27 January 1944). Yet this does 
not mean that the daily considered the Argentine military 
regime tantamount to a totalitarian system; in fact be-
tween 1943 and 1944, it sought to appease the govern-
ment and establish fluid relationships with national 
authorities.
Thus, in 1944, the newspaper defended the then Min-
ister of War, Perón, against accusations from the US De-
partment of State, which said that the Argentine minister 
took the bellicose and totalitarian position of the Argen-
tine government in his speeches. La Nación argued that 
the US government had misinterpreted Perón’s words and 
criticized US hostility toward a representative of the Ar-
gentine government (Sidicaro, 1993: 184). This episode 
shows that the Argentine newspaper’s interpretations of 
events did not solely depend on the images produced by 
US authorities.
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The animosity of the US government toward Perón 
had its roots in the traditional diplomatic rivalry between 
the two countries and in the Argentine government’s per-
sistence in maintaining neutrality during World War II 
(Escudé, 1983: 52-65). The United States considered a 
US-led united front in the Western Hemisphere, to be 
necessary in order to adequately face the Nazi’s aggres-
sion in Europe, but Argentina and Chile held out until the 
very last minute. In February 1944, the US government 
did not recognize the new military government of Gen-
eral Farrell (of which Perón was a member) and US Sec-
retary of State Cordell Hull accused Argentine rulers of 
being “totalitarian” (Lanús, 1984: 19; Escudé, 1983: 
128-134). Finally, after almost a year of diplomatic isola-
tion, the Argentine government was forced to declare 
war on the Axis in March 1945.
Spruille Braden, US Ambassador in Argentina for 
few months in 1945, clashed with Perón repeatedly. 
Braden participated in the political mobilization of gov-
ernment opposition and accused the military government 
of being under Nazi influence (Lanús, 1984: 34-37). He 
was the author of the so-called Blue Book, which had 
been published by the US Department of State a few 
weeks before the Argentine elections of February 1946 
with the goal of defeating Perón’s candidacy. The Book 
reinforced accusations about Perón’s totalitarian features 
and denounced his connections with the Axis. Neverthe-
less, there was no unanimous position among US gov-
ernmental circles with regard to Argentina (Escudé, 
1983: 180-198; Lanús, 1984: 37).
Perón’s ascent within the regime and the clear percep-
tion that the military was trying to perpetuate its power 
through Perón led to a rift between the government and 
La Nación. The creation of the Democratic Union and 
Perón’s victory were crucial here. The Democratic Union, 
a motley coalition of groups opposed to Perón, spanning 
from radicals to the communist party (with some conserv-
ative support), quickly obtained the endorsement of La 
Nación. In this context of tectonic shifts in political align-
ment, the concept of totalitarianism came alive again for 
La Nación as well as most of the opposition.
The convergence of Braden with Argentine opposition 
should alert us about the peculiar path of the word totali-
tarian in the Argentine public sphere. The creation of the 
Democratic Union drew more on the European example 
of anti-fascist coalitions (the Popular Fronts) than on the 
United States’ influence. Argentine elections were held in 
February 1946, more than a year before Harry S. Truman 
proclaimed his famous doctrine and observed that the 
world was witnessing the clash of totalitarianism against 
freedom (Engerman, 2010: 36). Furthermore, an impor-
tant part of the US conceptual construction of totalitarian-
ism, the dichotomy between freedom and slavery, was 
completely missed in the Argentine case.8 In fact, rather 
than speaking of direct influences it can be argued that the 
conceptualization of totalitarianism in Argentina ran par-
allel to the process as it unfolded in the United States. 
The European debates loomed large both in the US and 
Argentina.
After the Second World War, the meaning of totalitari-
anism evolved and increasingly referred to the context of 
various European nations under Soviet influence. As 
shown by Artinian in his contribution to this dossier, Ar-
gentine socialists also labeled Peronism as a totalitarian 
movement. But in the socialist discourse, totalitarianism 
referred more frequently to the Nazi and fascist para-
digms than to the Stalinist one (Artinian, 2015). Another 
difference is important here. Whereas the socialists did 
not hesitate to accuse Perón himself of being a totalitarian 
ruler, La Nación preferred to concentrate its increased use 
of the word totalitarian in its exploration of international 
topics. The Socialist Party had already been excluded 
from the political game by the Peronist juggernaut, but 
the stakes were higher for La Nación, which was still a 
part of the mainstream media; therefore it had to act more 
cautiously.
As a consequence, the conservative daily newspaper 
launched an indirect criticism of the Peronist government 
through a narrative about the origins of the Cold War. In 
fact, La Nación, as with its critiques of Soviet totalitarian-
ism, used tougher words in its articles on international af-
fairs than those that had been employed in their criticism 
of Peronism. International affairs allowed the daily a 
more aggressive position, which would have been a risky 
one in the case of domestic news.
La Nación also updated its criticism of Peronism but 
avoided becoming entrenched in the idea of Perón as a 
fascist leader. Its denouncement of Soviet communism 
and its —more or less hidden— allusions to Perón’s 
government did not imply that Peronism was a commu-
nist movement. The journalists of La Nación clearly dis-
tinguished between both political options. Nor did La 
Nación’s writers seek to launch an attack on Argentine 
communists, who at least for a while were considered to 
be allies in the fight against Perón. Nevertheless, La 
Nación’s analysis of the Cold War allowed the newspa-
per to elaborate on the issue of a radical rupture in the 
Argentine public scene between the totalitarians and the 
defenders of freedom, between those who wanted to 
break the rules of civilization and end the traditions re-
quired for peaceful life in society and those who wanted 
to preserve them. This rupture was akin to the one Per-
onism was imposing on Argentine society through its 
rhetorical distinction between an oligarchy and the 
people.
How did La Nación define totalitarianism? What role 
did play Peronism in that definition? How did this defini-
tion work within the Cold War context? Totalitarianism 
had multiple features, and it is difficult to establish a co-
herent position. Editorials sometimes emphasized its eco-
nomic or political dimensions while others preferred to 
accentuate the ideological aspects of the phenomenon. It 
is not possible to point out an evolution of the daily in 
this regard or to observe a greater concern for some fea-
tures of totalitarianism over others. Nonetheless, for the 
sake of clarity, I will focus first on economic and labor 
issues, second on political and ideological aspects, and 
third on cultural ones.
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Economic Intervention and Social Conflict
La Nación paid significant attention to the issue of the 
state’s intervention in the economy. Usually seen as a 
negative feature, it was variously labeled as “dirigisme,” 
“planning,” “statism,” or “collectivism.” The very abun-
dance of definitions reveals the complexity behind this 
topic. Totalitarian economic measures such as central 
planning or greater economic intervention in production 
and distribution were assumedly part of the Peronist rep-
ertoire as well. Thus, the IAPI (Argentine Institute for the 
Promotion of Trade), the state agency in charge of regu-
lating Argentine exports, was connected by La Nación to 
both Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism (Sidicaro, 1993: 
201). References to “statism” were linked to the negative 
progression of a bureaucracy that was too powerful (LN, 
11 May 1947 or 1 June 1947), which was also one of La 
Nación’s constant critiques of Perón’s government. Eco-
nomic interference meant the end of any hope for the 
“advance[ment] of . . . multiple establishments of . . . en-
trepreneurs” (“en la prosecución de la marcha de los 
múltiples establecimientos de las fuerzas vivas”) (LN, 11 
May 1947). La Nación’s readers easily found in these 
lines the newspaper’s frequent concerns with regard to 
Argentine domestic issues, particularly, its desire to en-
courage the activities of the entrepreneurial classes 
(“fuerzas vivas”).
The negative impact of “dirigisme” was obvious to 
both totalitarian regimes and Perón’s Argentina. The most 
insidious effect was inflation (see LN, 10 February 1950). 
In an article entitled, “The unavoidable mechanism of 
prices” (LN, 13 February 1950), the monetary policies of 
Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and fascist Italy were com-
pared. In Germany an attempt was made “to guarantee 
businessmen a fair and reasonable profit.” In Soviet Rus-
sia, “different mechanisms were employed.” In Italy, “de-
spite the measures taken, it was not possible to avoid in-
tense variations in prices.” (LN, 13 February 1950) The 
article did not refer to Argentina, but the reader could eas-
ily grasp the implicit comparison between Argentine in-
flation and the three dictatorships. This connection was 
particularly true with Italy, where according to the news-
paper article’s author, interventionist measures had been 
less successful.
The issue of economic interventionism was nonethe-
less complex. Planning, an increase in state bureaucracy, 
and so on were not features that belonged exclusively to 
totalitarian regimes. The 1930s economic crisis and the 
Second World War had bequeathed a wide consensus 
among international politicians concerning the need for 
state intervention in order to regulate economic cycles. In 
its recent past, La Nación had maintained a position in 
favor of stimulating manufactures, an idea not far from 
Perón’s beliefs, and the Democratic Union defended an 
economic and social program that was not radically dif-
ferent from the one espoused by Perón.
In fact, it has been argued that most Latin American 
governments expected to continue on a path of industri-
al growth and state intervention after the Second World 
War with the help of US loans. Yet, the new circum-
stances created by the overstretching of US compromis-
es in the World and the emergence of the Cold War sce-
nario led the Truman administration to encourage a 
more liberal (i.e., laissez-faire) attitude toward govern-
ments in the Western Hemisphere (Leffler, 1992; Bethell 
and Roxborough, 1992: 21-22). La Nación assumed a 
similar position, but its defense of economic liberalism 
was a result of its political conflict with the Argentine 
government.
US economic policy, in comparison to those of West-
ern European countries, occupied a marginal place in 
the pages of La Nación. However, resorting to these na-
tions as models of economic policy for Argentina raised 
some serious problems. In fact, Perón’s economic poli-
cies, including the idea of nationalization or of having 
generous social policies, were closer to those that had 
been implemented in some democratic countries, such 
as the United Kingdom, than those applied by totalitari-
an states (Halperín Donghi, 2003: 238). This complexity 
forced the writers of La Nación to elaborate a more so-
phisticated argument, with an eye to the realities of 
Western Europe. Thus, if these countries implemented 
interventionist policies, it was due to the Second World 
War and to the pernicious influence of totalitarianism 
(LN, 15 May 1949): 
The commotion in the ideas as a result of the totalitarian 
systems and the war has brought the reform of the tradi-
tional concepts . . . following precipitat[ing] procedures, 
sometimes abrupt ones, in lieu of the profound medita-
tion that must accompany the actions of the govern-
ments. The value of traditions . . . has been destroyed by 
the iconoclasts of the new era . . . The images of the old 
cult [have] been destroyed, being replaced by the faith 
in a single god, the omnipotent and omniscient State 
(LN, 11 May 1947).
This passage provides some themes that would be-
come common in La Nación’s analysis of the Soviet re-
gime, such as the cult of the State and the idea of attack-
ing traditions. The difference here is that these features 
appeared to be linked to the policies of democratic na-
tions. How then could this conundrum be solved? La 
Nación sought in an appropriate example from some 
Western political leaders but focused mainly on their civil 
societies as a ray of hope for the future. Thus, Italians and 
their representatives were applauded because of their re-
jection “of the omnipotent State of the fascist era” (LN, 
11 May 1947). The reaction of European civil societies 
was well reflected, according to the editorials of La 
Nación, from the electoral victories of conservative, 
Christian, democratic, or anti-communist forces in gener-
al (LN, 10 June 1950). Only in Britain was the Labour 
Party still committed to a program of nationalization. 
However, even there, “the consequences of the statist fer-
vor” had become apparent (LN, 10 June 1950).
If democratic nations were escaping from the traps of 
dirigisme thanks to the solid reaction of their civil socie-
ties, a question rose about the capacity of Argentine civil 
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society. As was mentioned above, La Nación maintained 
an optimistic view of the Argentine voters before the 
elections of 1946. After that, its comparison with Euro-
pean democracies cast some shadows on the possibilities 
of reacting against interventionism: “the only Western ex-
amples of vitality of dirigisme are found in our primitive 
[primaria] America, always untimely in the election of its 
fashions” (LN, 10 June 1950).9
In addition to economic troubles, communist influ-
ence on the postwar period brought a second evil: an in-
crease in the number of strikes. Again, the situation in 
Western Europe served as a frame of reference for the Ar-
gentine case. This preoccupation with labor unrest 
reached its peak in 1947, coinciding with an intense wave 
of strikes in Europe and the presence of communist repre-
sentatives in the Italian and French governments.10 Ac-
cording to La Nación, strikes and excessive workers’ de-
mands put a halt on economic recovery. In France, the 
economic difficulties inherited from the war were diffi-
cult to overcome due to the fact that “strikes are constant-
ly repeated.” (LN, 23 November 1947) In La Nación’s 
analysis of these strikes, it is easy to identify a veiled 
criticism of the inflationary wage policy carried out by 
Perón. French workers had asked for better salaries in or-
der to catch up to prices, but this action caused greater 
havoc: “The same phenomenon [which happens] in other 
nations is reproduced there” (LN, 23 November 1947).11 
Obviously, by “other nations,” the paper was referring to 
Argentina.
La Nación put the blame on “disoriented unions,” 
which did not understand reality or the “demands of soci-
ety” (“exigencias de la sociedad”). Such was the case of 
bank clerks in France who walked out of work after ask-
ing for a five-day workweek (LN, 13 April 1947). Not 
only French strikers were irresponsible, but also, accord-
ing to La Nación “the Buenos Aires government[,] which 
has established . . . Saturday as a day off, [did so] without 
any reasonable justification” (LN, 13 April 1947).
The “demands of society” included an increase in 
work hours and productivity. This would help European 
recovery and ultimately aid in the fight against Soviet 
threats. This rhetoric of productivity as the solution to 
the social and labor problems of the postwar period 
agreed with the recommendations of US experts and 
politicians for Western Europe (Maier, 1977; Roxbor-
ough, 1994: 259). Concern about labor unrest in Europe 
reflected the general preoccupation with labor conflicts 
at home. Not only did La Nación consider the number of 
strikes occurring to be excessive but it also found the 
increasing lack of discipline in work places to be dan-
gerous: “From some time ago it is noticeable the fre-
quency with which some groups of workers abandon 
their tasks, [even without] mentioning their apathy when 
they fulfill them” (LN, 9 September 1947). This was a 
criticism of worker empowerment by Perón’s policies, 
such as the so-called comisiones internas (internal com-
missions), composed of union representatives, which 
monitored compliance to labor agreements and influ-
enced the way work and labor discipline was carried out 
within factories (James, 2006: 84-90). For La Nación 
(and most businessmen) the co-option of trade unions 
and the political demobilization carried out by Peronism 
were not enough when the country faced an increase in 
labor costs and episodes of indiscipline.
The daily insisted on the need for an increased work 
effort in Argentina. Revealing enough, this effort was in-
tended to help European recovery (LN, 9 November 
1947). In comments about labor conflicts in Argentina, 
references to the European situation were commonplace. 
Thus, while criticizing a stoppage of milkmen in Buenos 
Aires, La Nación stated: “Within every nation and in the 
international community, the spirit of solidarity we have 
referred to is indispensable” (LN, 1 February 1948). Ulti-
mately, European recovery might contribute to Argentine 
economic growth. Nonetheless, this latter argument did 
not appear in the newspaper’s pages. In fact, European 
recovery was as good in itself as a bulwark against com-
munism (LN, 9 November 1947).
At home, one of the most daunting efforts of the US 
Democratic Party’s government was to persuade US citi-
zens of the need to contribute to European recovery after 
the Second World War. The Marshall Plan and other fi-
nancial aid were justified as an inexcusable duty for the 
United States in its fight for freedom. In particular, as ten-
sions mounted in 1947, the recovery of West Germany 
became crucial (Hitchcock, 2010: 166.167; Leffler, 2010: 
76-79). La Nación also believed that European recovery 
was essential in order to defeat communism, although 
Germany played a secondary part in its narrative, thus re-
vealing Argentina’s traditional connections with countries 
such as France or Italy. Furthermore, recovery was only 
possible through the establishment of labor discipline 
both in Western Europe and in those countries not direct-
ly affected by the Second World War, like Argentina. 
Therefore, the international challenge became a domestic 
challenge against Peronist unions and workers.
Totalitarian Policies
But rather than focusing on economic or social issues, 
the political dimensions of totalitarianism became the ful-
crum of La Nación’s attitude toward the Soviet Union. 
Through its critique of the Soviet regime, the daily news-
paper introduced a veiled indictment of Perón’s adminis-
tration. Some topics such as constraints on freedom of 
speech or harassment of the opposition helped La Nación 
compare the Argentine government to totalitarian rulers. 
On some occasions, the paper, out of precaution, spoke of 
“imitators” or “emulators” of totalitarian governments, 
which still constituted an obvious reference to Perón’s 
rule.
For the sake of clarity, we can separately analyze the 
different features that composed the concept of totalitari-
anism as employed by La Nación. First, as happened in 
the United States, totalitarianism served to label together 
fascist and communist regimes ; therefore it helped legiti-
matize the new conflict with the Soviet Union as a con-
tinuation of the struggle from World War II. In fact, in 
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one of its references to this question, La Nación quoted 
Spruille Braden —then in charge of Latin American Af-
fairs within the Department of State— mentioning the 
similarities between fascism and communism (LN, 9 
March 1947). Nevertheless, La Nación’s position evolved 
in an autonomous way, without significant influence from 
the US media or academic discussions.
The memories of World War II were still fresh both in 
the Unites States and in Argentina, and the idea that fas-
cisms might strike back was not foreign to most people 
(LN, 25 May 1947).12 Yet, the idea that communism was 
the natural inheritor of those “aberrations” became com-
monplace in La Nación. As in the US discourse on totali-
tarianism, La Nación underlined similar characteristics in 
the methods employed by communist and fascist regimes 
(LN, 22 June 1947 or LN, 4 May 1950; Adler and Pater-
son, 1970: 1048). A 1948 editorial stated clearly that 
communism was the successor of Nazism (LN, 12 Sep-
tember 1948).
What was Peronism’s place in this comparison? As 
Ricardo Sidicaro pointed out, the new political phenome-
non, Peronism, was categorized by La Nación as a refor-
mulation of an old Latin American practice: nineteenth 
century caudillismo (Sidicaro, 1993: 192). Nonetheless, 
the arrival of the Cold War altered the definition of Peron-
ism as a form of caudillismo and at the very least intro-
duced some nuances by adding the totalitarianism label to 
the picture.
Sometimes, other words such as “dictatorship” were 
employed, inducing readers to compare Perón’s regime 
with those systems. Hence, an editorial published in ear-
ly 1947 referred to a “more or less disguised dictator-
ship,” where “with the exception of [a] few countries in 
which there is a more or less disguised dictatorship, 
there is a trend toward joining efforts beyond ideolo-
gies” (LN, 26 January 1947). The idea of joining efforts 
referred to the coalition governments established in 
Western Europe, which included communist members in 
some cases. But the ambiguous mention of a “more or 
less disguised dictatorship” spoke of some European 
countries under the aegis of the Soviet Union and at the 
same time to Perón’s government, which was usually 
criticized for his rejection of any kind of cooperation 
with opposition parties.
As time went by, the references to Perón became more 
obvious. Peronism began to be conceived as an “authori-
tarian tendency” or a “strong government.” In these ex-
pressions and in the idea of a more or less hidden dicta-
torship, the former definition of Peronism as caudillismo 
and its new one as totalitarianism merged: “Everyone no-
tice the authoritarian governments which mock constitu-
tions and rules. In the end, they are not other things but 
the traditional South American dictatorships, which hide 
their historical ascendency under demagogic forms taken 
from the totalitarian regimes” (LN, 6 February 1951). The 
dictatorships found at home in South America had formed 
due to the lack of political culture in the region. In those 
nations with a solid democratic political culture (the Unit-
ed States and the United Kingdom were the ideal models 
for La Nación), it “is pointless to speak not about totali-
tarianism, rejected as a crime, but even of a strong gov-
ernment if this means a government that dismisses popu-
lar sovereignty . . . . This is the reason why a plebiscite 
does not transform a dictator or a despot into a democrat-
ic ruler” (LN, 23 November 1947). The reader could eas-
ily assume that Perón’s Argentina belonged to this pessi-
mistic account of South America, among other reasons 
because La Nación had explicitly mentioned this opinion 
elsewhere (LN, 27 November 1949).
Several features of totalitarian regimes lambasted by 
the Argentine daily served as a mirror of Peronism. The 
most significant ones referred to procedures and rules, the 
harassment of opposition, the violation of fundamental 
liberties including freedom of speech and the press, and 
the cult of the leader. The violation of rules and proce-
dures in Perón’s Argentina was akin to the many abuses 
committed by communist governments in Europe. In an 
article about the debates in Moscow on the federal organ-
ization of the Soviet Union, the article writer ended up 
commenting on the Argentine situation and the “trend 
among some governments to infringe [upon] consecrated 
principles” (LN, 23 March 1947). What distinguished to-
talitarian countries and their imitators from true democra-
cies was their respect or lack thereof for rules and proce-
dures (LN, 8 June 1947; LN, 22 June 1947). The defense 
of democratic procedures was a fundamental battle: “one 
of the securest means in order to preserve human dignity 
is the strict application of the principles [postulados] of 
democracy” (LN, 31 August 1947).
What were these coveted principles? First the defense 
of the civil liberties, among them freedom of speech and 
the press. The latter was obviously a recurrent preoccupa-
tion for La Nación. Indeed, growing Peronist influence on 
the media had caused a bitter conflict with the opposition 
press; therefore it is not surprising that the denouncement 
of communist curtailment of freedom of the press occu-
pied numerous pages in the daily. Perón’s government 
sought support within the media and tried to silence those 
outlets unsympathetic to its positions. In 1947, for in-
stance, the Argentine Central Bank suspended permission 
for imported printing paper and the government arbitrari-
ly allocated paper quantities among the newspapers. Be-
ginning in August 1947, the authorities closed many pa-
pers considered hostile. La Nación, in a risky move, 
angrily denounced the constraints on freedom of the press 
in the Soviet Union and its satellites as a means to attack 
constraints on freedom of the press in Argentina (Sidica-
ro, 1993: 204).
The question of the freedom of the press had played 
an important part in relations between Argentina and the 
United States beginning in the last years of the Second 
World War amidst a battle of propaganda concerning the 
declaration of war against the Axis powers. Thus, a memo 
sent to the US Secretary of State in January 1945, reveal-
ingly titled “Attitude of the United States toward Argen-
tine Censorship of the Press and Treatment of Press Rep-
resentatives,” complained about the restrictions to the 
freedom of the press imposed on the “democratic dailies, 
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La Nación and La Prensa,” by the Argentine military 
government.13 Of course, freedom of the press belonged 
to the core part of US ideology, but connections with 
some Argentine papers such as La Nación or La Prensa 
were particularly apparent. Both were frequently referred 
to as the “democratic” or the “independent” press. In the 
case of La Prensa, the newspaper owner had important 
relationships with the US media, and the situation of the 
Argentine press was a theme of discussion within US 
public opinion and the Department of State (Morgenfeld, 
2012: 80). On some occasions, the US representatives in 
Argentina used economic negotiations as a weapon in an 
attempt to press Perón’s government to offer gentler treat-
ment of La Nación and La Prensa. In 1950, amidst nego-
tiations with Perón’s government regarding a loan from 
the Export-Import Bank of the US, Edward Miller, Assis-
tant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, stated 
that thanks to “our new cooperative attitude in the eco-
nomic field” he had obtained from the Argentine Minister 
of Finance, Ramón Cereijo, “a personal commitment that 
newsprint will continue to be granted to La Nación and 
La Prensa as long as he is in office.”14
It might also be possible that United States media 
and cultural structures influenced Argentine newspa-
pers. But the development of “public diplomacy” was 
still precarious in many Latin American regions during 
the early phases of the Cold War.15 Furthermore, coop-
eration between US authorities and the Argentine media 
had obvious limits. Strategic reasons sometimes stymied 
US pressure on the Argentine government. Thus, in 
1951, the United States government impeded the Latin 
American Ministers of Foreign Affairs attempt to pass a 
resolution condemning the Argentine government for 
the nationalization of La Prensa. The US government 
thus avoided a new confrontation with Argentina in the 
context of the Korean War (Morgenfeld, 2012: 80). On 
the other hand, as seen in the case of La Nación, autono-
mous impulses ultimately shaped the ideological evolu-
tion of the daily.
Democracy was also about the rule of law and the 
absence of arbitrariness. This evolution toward a proce-
dural definition of democracy was concurrently taking 
place in the academic and political environment of the 
United States during these years. The former emphasis 
on the social meanings of implication was being re-
placed by a conceptualization that accentuated democ-
racy’s differences from the Soviet Union. The United 
States’ main characteristics were precisely those that 
were more conspicuously absent in the Soviet Union: 
civic liberties, competitive elections, and a free press 
(Jervis, 2010: 29).
The parallelism with Argentina was apparent. In Ar-
gentina, the social implications of the word democracy 
became important after the economic crisis of 1930s, and 
these implications achieved a hegemonic position with 
Perón’s ascent to power and his rhetoric about “social jus-
tice.” La Nación, by emphasizing procedures, distin-
guished its position on democracy from Perón’s practices 
and from his constituency, which linked popular sover-
eignty with social policies. There is, however, a signifi-
cant difference in the evolution of ideas concerning de-
mocracy, especially with regard to electoral devices, in 
La Nación versus the US media. Whereas in US academia 
and media competitive elections were an essential feature 
of democracy, for La Nación, elections played a second-
ary role. Until 1946, when the newspaper was still hoping 
for an electoral defeat of Perón, elections were an undis-
putable source of legitimacy. But Perón’s triumph led the 
paper to cast some doubt on the legitimacy of elections 
(Sidicaro, 1993: 197, 203).
La Nación regularly denounced the government’s har-
assment of the opposition, the ban on meetings, the at-
tacks on the press, and the imprisonment of political lead-
ers.16 These actions undermined the credibility of electoral 
processes in Argentina partially because they eroded the 
rights of minorities. Therefore, obtaining an electoral ma-
jority was not enough to be considered a legitimate au-
thority (LN, 27 April 1947). The denouncement of at-
tempts to impose unanimity by excluding the opposition 
was constantly brought forth as an attack on communist 
countries (LN, 29 March 1950 or LN, 27 March 1950) but 
it also appeared in the context of domestic politics (LN, 
28 March 1950).17
The Argentine reader probably read the comments 
about elections in communist countries with an eye on 
the domestic situation. More than a precise analysis of 
the processes through which communist governments in 
Central and Eastern Europe had built their power, the 
denouncement of attempts to impose unanimity or sin-
gle lists reflected Peronism’s attempts to shape a nation-
al political community whose borders would coincide 
with the political movement in power. In fact, the idea 
that Peronism was a plebiscitary rather than a democrat-
ic regime emerged at this time. In March 1950, an edito-
rial fittingly entitled “Plebiscites and Majorities,” stated: 
“Minorities whose will expresses itself in elections, 
sometimes with numbers close to those obtained by ma-
jorities . . . did not deserve to be treated in a democratic 
and constitutional regime as [if] defeated in a merciless 
war” (LN, 18 March 1950). The reference to Perón’s 
government is obvious, both in the idea of a war being 
raged against the “defeated” and also in the issue of an 
adjusted electoral victory. In February 1946, Perón won 
the political election but the opposition obtained 46% of 
the ballots (Torre, 2002: 38). 
At this time, La Nación developed another more con-
servative line of criticism to Perón. According to the dai-
ly, democracies should respect tradition. In fact, on many 
occasions, rules, procedures, and traditions appeared to 
be synonymous. Thus, when the paper spoke of nations 
with a better political culture than Argentina (or Latin 
America), it also asserted that there was greater respect 
for tradition in those nations as well (LN, 26 January 
1947). In 1948, facing the proposal for a constitutional 
reform that included the possibility of presidential re-
election, La Nación advocated the need to preserve insti-
tutional continuity (LN, 18 January 1948). The newspaper 
linked its defense of stable rules with the Cold War: “The 
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unstable situation in the European continent, with its in-
evitable impact on the rest of countries, contributes to in-
tensify the expectations aroused by the . . . coming elec-
tions” (LN, 18 January 1948). In an editorial that appeared 
at the end of 1948, this position became even more obvi-
ous. The Argentine Congress had recently voted to allow 
a constitutional reform. According to La Nación, this pro-
cess would open the door to an uncertain and dangerous 
future: 
Representatives will obtain a blank check and we can-
not discard beforehand any possible exaggeration in 
their innovative spirit . . . .
We have the privilege of being among the peoples who, 
amidst a deranged world and submitted to the chance of 
temerarious adventures, continue being ruled under old 
institutions, [which are the] basis for [our] political sta-
bility and historical continuity (LN, 5 December 1948).
“Temerarious adventures” referred to the political ex-
periments carried out in Central and Eastern European 
nations. The options for Argentina were clear: it could re-
spect its historical traditions and follow the example of 
nations with a better political culture and more stable in-
stitutions, such as the United States or Britain, or it could 
embark upon an uncertain voyage under the guise of a 
constitutional reform. In the turbulent context of the early 
Cold War, respect for tradition was the best guarantee of 
stability.
Facing a Totalitarian Culture
The defense of traditions against dangerous experi-
ments was also present in La Nación’s reflections on the 
cultural features of totalitarianism and therefore in its 
analysis of the cultural practices of Peronism. In 1950, 
perhaps as a result of the economic slump begun in 1949 
or because the government felt strongly enough, Perón 
pursued a tougher line in his search for social consensus. 
Thus educational policies openly became doctrinaire, 
stirring the newspaper’s opposition. This conflict led the 
daily to pay greater attention to the cultural features of 
totalitarianism.
According to La Nación, totalitarian regimes made a 
sinister use of words, resorting constantly to the manipu-
lation of language: “This is the favorite field of the totali-
tarian strategy. Their insolence is to maintain that black is 
white, that those who were assaulted were the aggressors, 
that the few are the many, that two plus two is six, that 
yesterday is after tomorrow, according to convenience” 
(LN, 30 July 1950). This manipulation of words was car-
ried out through propaganda. In totalitarian regimes prop-
aganda was controlled by the state (LN, 20 August 1950). 
The word propaganda acquired negative connotations af-
ter its use by the Nazi regime and became a synonym of 
falseness. What were the lies propaganda tried to convey? 
First, it attributed to a single group the only authentic rep-
resentation of the nation (LN, 20 August 1950). Second, 
propaganda created a cult of personality dependent on the 
leader, especially in Stalin’s case (LN, 22 December 
1950). A 1950s article emphasized that the cult of person-
ality was usually accompanied by so-called mysticism 
(mística), that is:
A devotion without limits, more about feelings than 
about reason, an idea, always incarnated in a man, the 
adoration in rapture of that man . . . . Political mysti-
cism, moreover, did not intend to influence individuals 
on a small scale, but on the crowds. The instrument of 
that influence is propaganda, the art whose permanent 
masters are the totalitarian regimes (LN, 3 November 
1950).
It is impossible not to perceive the local echoes of 
these words. It has been common in Argentina, even 
among Perón’s supporters, to speak of “Peronist mysti-
cism.” Furthermore, Peronism tried to indoctrinate the 
Argentine masses through intense propaganda campaigns. 
These campaigns praised the leader and his role in the 
transformation of the country and appropriated national 
symbols for Peronism. This process culminated in 1952 
with the government’s proclamation of the “Peronist doc-
trine” as the “national doctrine” (Plotkin, 1993: 46). Of 
course, the capacity (or willingness) of Peronism to unite 
the whole society and suppress any source of dissent was 
far from the realities of the Soviet Union. Yet, in the con-
text of bitter political conflict between the government 
and its opposition, La Nación provided its readers with an 
image of totalitarian regimes that served as a mirror for 
Perón’s rule.
Educational issues became one of the thorniest battle-
fronts in the political conflict. Here, resorting to the totali-
tarian image became ubiquitous (Sidicaro, 1993: 211). 
The goal of political indoctrination through the schools 
became apparent with Armando Méndez de San Martín’s 
arrival to the Ministry of Education in 1950. As Mariano 
Plotkin (1993: 151) points out, Peronism sought to trans-
form itself into a sort of religion of state. At the end of 
1949, the Ministry of Education adopted a single text-
book for elementary schools nationwide. According to La 
Nación, the textbook, which had not been submitted to 
Congress for approval, began to be distributed to schools 
in 1950; in truth, “Peronist” textbooks were nor widely 
introduced until 1952.18 The idea of introducing a unified 
textbook (el texto único) had already been proposed by 
nationalist thinkers in the 1930s. La Nación acknowl-
edged that this was not a Peronist invention, but it reject-
ed a policy that attacked the neutrality of public schools 
(Plotkin, 1993: 173; LN, 17 March 1950). The textbook 
“means the ideological monopoly of the state. [This is a] 
system adequate for the education of a country under a 
totalitarian regime” (LN, 2 April 1950). These were, ac-
cording to the daily, the kind of policies implemented in 
fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and, obviously, the Soviet 
Union. La Nación mentioned as evidence the well-known 
words of the former Soviet Commissar, Grigory Zino-
viev: “we have to appropriate the soul of the child” (LN, 2 
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April 1950). Fear of young minds being manipulated was 
a permanent facet of these denouncements: “In this, as in 
other psychological devices, the Soviets resemble the Na-
zis, and both totalitarian regimes . . . led new generations 
to the death of the soul” (LN, 3 December 1950. See also 
LN, 4 February 1951).
La Nación was also preoccupied with the Peronism 
project for the political control and intellectual indoctri-
nation of teachers, which had become apparent in 1950 
(Plotkin, 1993: 172-174). In an editorial from that year, 
entitled “The Democratic School,” the newspaper de-
nounced the coercion exerted on teachers who were being 
forced to affiliate themselves with the official union and 
warned, “We must strictly avoid that our public education 
system adopts ways of organization or contents of learn-
ing identical to those of the communist or fascist regimes” 
(LN, 25 June 1950. See also LN, 21 August 1950).
One of the aims of propaganda and totalitarian educa-
tion was to transmit a new view of history. Thus, La 
Nación warned that society should avoid the textbook be-
cause “through capricious diversions in the appraisal of 
facts, epochs and historical figures . . . [it could become] 
an organ of factious propaganda” (LN, 13 February 1951). 
The issue of the reinvention of history carried out by the 
totalitarian regimes occupied a significant place in La 
Nación’s analysis, and it was linked with the daily’s de-
fense of tradition. Nonetheless, this entailed some risks 
for the paper.
La Nación echoed the nineteenth-century conserva-
tive idea about the impossibility of making a blank sheet 
of the past (LN, 5 January 1951). Totalitarian regimes 
aimed at “inculcating in the young and the ignorant 
what can be called a new consciousness and it is usually 
a deceitful consciousness . . . by rejecting the work of 
past generations . . . . [Totalitarianism] extols at the 
same time the unique splendor of the regime in power” 
(LN, 5 January 1951). Did Peronism embody these prac-
tices? In the same article, the journalist introduced an 
ironic comparison between Chinese and Argentine peo-
ples: “The aspiration to be the first comers is as suicidal 
as to believe to be the last ones . . . . We don’t have rea-
sons to believe that these elemental truths are only 
known by Argentineans and not by the clever yellow 
people” (LN, 5 January 1951). One possible interpreta-
tion of this phrase was that neither Argentines nor 
Asians would be cheated by those who wanted to alter 
the narratives of the past, to suppress old heroes and cre-
ate new ones.19 A second interpretation might indicate 
that both in Argentina and in China a process of histori-
cal forgery was already taking place and both societies 
should be on alert.
In another article about Czechoslovakia, criticism of 
iconoclasm from the new revolutionary totalitarianisms 
appeared. The editorial mentioned how the Czechoslova-
kian communist government, under Moscow’s influence, 
had banned the circulation of postage stamps with the 
faces of Tomás Masaryk and Edvard Benes, two of the 
nation’s founding fathers. According to La Nación, the 
crime both historical figures were guilty of was their re-
publican ideas and their profession of “an ideal of free-
dom for everyone.” The article ended with an attack on 
the foundational character that the dictatorship aspired to 
establish as well as a new defense of continuity (LN, 31 
July 1949).
The brutal use of propaganda, attempts at indoctrina-
tion, and the manipulation of history and words charac-
terized totalitarian regimes (and therefore Peronism). 
However even if this portrait is to some extent accurate, it 
is also a stylization and reminds the reader of well-known 
dystopias, such as the one found in George Orwell’s 
1984, which was published in 1948. In fact, La Nación 
referred to Orwell several times. Adler and Paterson 
(1970: 1,063) have shown Orwell’s impact in the US im-
agination with regard to totalitarianism. A similar process 
occurred in the Argentine case (not only for La Nación), 
and these European oeuvres elaborated by left-wing crit-
ics of Stalinism helped create a negative image of Peron-
ism among both left-wing intellectuals and liberal and 
conservative critics of the movement.
La Nación’s View on Global Affairs
La Nación’s analysis of the use of history by totalitar-
ian regimes did not depend exclusively on the practices of 
Perón’s government. The newspaper had its own view of 
the world, one that it had forged before the rise of Perón 
and the beginnings the Cold War. Peronism and the Cold 
War influenced the daily’s ideas about the world, but the 
central tenets of these ideas had roots in the past that sur-
vived under Perón’s rule.
The presentation of the communist regime as a to-
talitarian system was not only a moral denouncement 
but also a warning about the threat that such systems 
constituted for all of humanity. This position was simi-
lar to the one adopted in the United States. After the 
creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), La Nación expressed its sympathy with the 
project: “This universal cause is also our cause, is the 
cause of America [that is, the Americas]. If this cause is 
defeated, life would lose meaning for authentic West-
erners” (LN, 13 March 1949).
La Nación emphasized the threat of Soviet commu-
nism by comparing it to the past Nazi threat toward civili-
zation as a whole. Communism was a global threat; there-
fore Latin America could not isolate itself (LN, 29 January 
1950). The newspaper’s aggressive tone and content re-
calls many of the messages elaborated in the United 
States when confronting the Soviet threat. Yet La Nación 
pursued its own way, autonomous from the discussions in 
the United States. Two examples are relevant here. The 
first refers to relationships with Francisco Franco’s Spain. 
In 1950, La Nación did not hesitate to criticize the US ap-
proach to the Spanish dictator. It stated that to appease 
regimes such as Franco’s was “dangerous and dangerous-
ly futile” (LN, 22 January 1950). In a different piece, 
without referring to the Unites States, a columnist said 
that supporting Franco in the process of integrating Spain 
into the United Nation (UN) caused disorientation and 
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frustration among “many men of good faith” and was ef-
fectively rescuing the weak Spanish dictatorship (LN, 27 
September 1950).
La Nación’s attitude toward Francoism did not emerge 
out of a liberal position; instead, it was probably linked to 
Perón’s cooperation with Spain. In 1946, Argentina was 
one of the few defenders of Franco’s Spain in the UN and 
in 1948 both countries signed the so-called Perón-Franco 
Protocol (Paradiso, 2002: 539). For a few years, Perón’s 
government was the only international ally to the isolated 
Spanish regime. Perón’s goal was to show his independ-
ent stance on international affairs. But La Nación empha-
sized the ideological connections between the Argentine 
government and a successor dictatorship from the defeat-
ed fascist regimes.
The second example refers to communism in Latin 
America. La Nación saw communism as a global threat. 
In Latin America, after a wave of democratization at the 
end of World War II, the Cold War encouraged the reac-
tion of conservative forces. Military and conservative 
governments repressed political freedoms: communist 
parties were banned and the labor movement was 
crushed, in many cases with US encouragement (Rox-
borough, 1994: 257; Bethell and Roxborough, 1988). 
Commenting on a wave of strikes in Bolivia in 1950, La 
Nación seemed to back Washington’s view that every 
social protest opened the way to communist penetra-
tion.20 When the communist party was proscribed in 
Chile, the daily newspaper applauded it (LN, 3 February 
1950).
However, La Nación’s analysis of the communist 
threat in Latin America as a whole and Argentina in par-
ticular offered some nuances. First, the struggle against 
communism did not justify all measures to combat it. 
Thus, La Nación condemned attacks on the “luminous 
principle” of freedom of the press in other Latin America 
countries, like Peru, in the name of the defense against 
communism (LN, 22 May 1950). This attitude reflected 
La Nación’s liberal ideology and its clash with Perón’s 
government regarding this issue. Besides, the newspaper 
denounced coups d’états, many of which were portrayed 
as combating communism; these seizures of government 
had been multiplying in the region since 1948: “the dicta-
torial spirit wins every day support” (LN, 11 May 1950; 
see also LN, 6 February 1951).
The role of communism in Argentina did allow some 
room for nuances as well. In fact, rather than focusing on 
communist activities in the country, La Nación preferred 
to insist on the government’s violations of civil rights in 
the name of anti-communism (LN, 24 June 1950).
There was also a divergence from the line estab-
lished by the US administration toward Perón’s re-
gime. In 1946, the new Ambassador in Buenos Aires, 
George Messersmith, left the position established by 
his predecessor, Braden. According to Messersmith, 
there was no Nazi menace in Argentina. The main 
problem was what he perceived to be the Soviet Un-
ion’s growing influence in Latin America. Taking this 
into consideration, Messersmith recommended that his 
government court Argentine friendship since the coun-
try could be an important asset in the hemispherical 
fight against communism (Lanús, 1984: 40). This was, 
of course, quite a different view from the one held by 
La Nación. However, the US Department of State, still 
under Braden’s influence, did not easily welcomed 
Messersmith’s ideas about Perón as a bulwark against 
communism. Even though between 1947 and 1950, the 
relationship between Argentina and the United States 
was fraught with ambiguity (to some extent due to the 
conflicts among US bureaucratic bodies), President 
Truman’s proclamation of containment for commu-
nism relieved the pressure on Perón’s regime (Morgen-
feld, 2012: 76-77).
But for La Nación the main focus of containment was 
Peronism. The Argentine Communist Party had partici-
pated in the 1946 elections as part of the Democratic Un-
ion against Perón. According to La Nación, Peronism and 
not communism was the greater threat to its independ-
ence and autonomy in Argentina. A piece that appeared in 
February 1951 reveals this position; it was a note from 
the union of newspaper salesmen. This union accused La 
Nación, with a threatening tone, of working for the inter-
ests of Wall Street by permitting in its pages “a group of 
communist of Rosario, which declared themselves lead-
ers of a so-called Federation of Newspapers and Maga-
zines of the Argentine Republic, a union that only exists 
in their imagination, [which] give[s] free rein to their dis-
appointment for not having been able to win over our 
trade” (LN, 10 February 1951). La Nación responded that 
it sought to inform its readers with objectivity. The viru-
lence of the union’s attack led La Nación to a moderate 
tone in its response, probably in fear of reprisals.21 The 
daily’s position vis-à-vis Argentine communists aimed to 
protect pluralism against governmental aspirations to rep-
resent the entire community.
Although this position can be understood in the do-
mestic context, there persisted a contradiction between 
the image of communism as a formidable threat to hu-
manity and the image of communist as a part of a diverse 
society in Argentina. How can this contradiction be ex-
plained? In order to respond to this question, it is worth 
exploring La Nación’s position regarding the process of 
imperial decomposition that accompanied the early phase 
of the Cold War. A good example is the Italian case. La 
Nación showed its solidarity with the country, which was 
losing “the administration of its colonies and, even more, 
[had] been stripped of the city of Trieste, despite the fact 
[that] most of its people” were Italian (LN, 18 April 
1948). This solidarity might have emerged out of Argen-
tina’s “close links with Italy” due to the presence of a siz-
able Italian community in the South American country 
(LN, 18 April 1948).
But the solidarity with European imperial powers went 
beyond the Italian case. The British case was paradigmatic. 
In 1948, La Nación reported on the electoral defeat of Jan 
Smuts in South Africa against the nationalists. For La 
Nación this result was ominous: “it challenges, or even 
puts in immediate jeopardy the fidelity of the dominions to 
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the Empire in moments [where] it faces global difficulties 
[that are] increasingly complex.” Furthermore, the nation-
alists had in the past shown sympathy for the Nazi Party 
and its goal was to marginalize natives. Therefore, “it is not 
an emancipatory movement in a democratic sense.” On the 
other hand, “the venerable Marshal Smuts, former hero of 
the Boers, represented progressive liberalism and imperial 
loyalty” (LN, 30 May 1948). However, La Nación’s back-
ing of Smuts was rather a defense of empire than a defense 
of democracy. Smuts was the architect of the new South 
Africa after the Boer Wars, recasting the country’s relation-
ship with the British Empire. In fact, Smuts believed that a 
segregated regime (of Boers and Britons) would unify 
whites in a common discourse of civilization and racial su-
premacy. The survival of empires, and in particular the 
British Empire, was essential in order to guarantee the suc-
cess of white civilizing enterprises in Africa. Thus, as Mark 
Mazower points out, Smuts played a significant role in the 
design of both the League of Nations and the United Na-
tions as international bodies that would help empires sur-
vive the profound impact of the World Wars (Mazower, 
2009: 28-65).
By portraying Smuts as a “progressive liberal,” La 
Nación also referred to the defense of the British Empire as 
a part of the liberal project. Manuel Mujica Láinez, an Ar-
gentine writer and journalist stationed in London, sent La 
Nación a gloomy account of the electoral results in South 
Africa (Mujica Láinez, “En las universidades se valora la 
permanencia espiritual británica,” LN, 30 May 1948). This 
defense of the British Empire again appeared in a critique 
of the British Labour government, which was accused not 
only of advancing dirigisme in Britain but also of weaken-
ing “the solidness of the British Empire” (LN, 12 January 
1950). Quoting Winston Churchill, La Nación underlined 
how the losses in the British Empire might have been 
caused by a “too realistic” conception of international af-
fairs, a conception based upon “materialism, like in the to-
talitarian regimes” (LN, 12 January 1950). In particular, La 
Nación emphasized the defense of the British Empire, al-
though it thought that all European empires should be pro-
tected. The Cold War made it even more necessary to pre-
serve imperial stability (LN, 18 November 1950).
The defense of European empires was not, according 
to La Nación, a defense of imperialism. In fact, this word 
always appeared in association with the Soviet Union or 
Nazi Germany; it did not refer to Britain or any other 
Western European power. La Nación defended a gradual 
approach to the independence of African and Asian colo-
nies. This position was akin to the one defended by US 
authorities. Whereas in principle the United States pro-
moted an anti-colonial discourse and the Wilsonian idea 
of self-government, as the Cold War scenario evolved, the 
need to support its European allies led to a more cautious 
and gradual perspective on decolonization. In fact, this 
contradiction had always been latent in US thought. Thus, 
President Woodrow Wilson himself did not consider Afri-
can and Asian peoples to be ready for self-government 
(Engerman, 2010: 22, 40; Manela, 2007). However, 
again, rather than being influenced by US ideas about de-
colonization, La Nación’s position evolved autonomously 
based upon its own ideological traditions. 
As in the case of the United States, Argentina as a na-
tion emerged out of a revolt against a European empire. 
Also, Argentine elites believed themselves to simultane-
ously belong to both the New World and to European 
civilization. Many Argentine intellectuals and politicians 
found in Wilson a congenial figure and hoped that the US 
President would bring a new brilliant era to the world 
(Halperín Donghi, 1999: 73). Wilson’s moralist approach 
to international affairs and respect for self-determination 
converged again with the mainstream liberal thought in 
Argentina.22 But, like Wilson, most Argentineans believed 
that the colonial world was not ready for democracy and 
self-government.23 La Nación inherited these ideas. It 
shared the Wilsonian credo for the necessity of applying a 
moral criterion to international affairs (LN, 15 October 
1944: 6), a specific contractualist view to international re-
lations, and it also distrusted non-European civilizations. 
But these ideas came from a strong Argentine liberal view 
of the world as much as from the influence of the United 
States. (In fact, until the beginning of the Korean War in 
1950, La Nación showed more enthusiasm for European 
empires than the more ambiguous and reluctant United 
States, (see Bradley, 2010:473).
The particularities of La Nación’s ideas can be better 
grasped by looking at the Peronist view on imperialism. 
In international affairs, Perón’s government adopted a 
rhetorical position labeled “third position,” that is, the 
idea of an autonomous international policy without the 
influence of the superpower. Yet, this was not a position 
of non-alignment but rather an emphasis on national sov-
ereignty. In fact, Perón’s diplomats never abjured from 
Argentina’s condition as a Western and Christian country 
and their anti-communism was an obvious fact (Paradiso, 
2002: 542-544). Perón’s actual international policy was 
not usually challenged by La Nación (with some excep-
tions concerning the Argentine government’s decision to 
not send troops to Korea).24 In a paradoxical way, La 
Nación converged with some nationalists who opposed 
Perón and criticized the weakness of the “third position,” 
choosing instead to defend the need for a close alliance of 
Latin Americans with the United States in order to re-
spond to the communist threat (Walter, 2001: 267).
A crucial difference between the government and La 
Nación was that the former oriented its discourse toward 
Latin America whereas the latter continued a tradition of 
supporting Argentine elites who searched for references 
and models in Europe (Paradiso, 2002: 566). This helps us 
understand the defense of European colonialism in the 
newspaper. Even if Peronism had not obtained power, one 
can assume that La Nación would have adopted a similar 
stance. International news was mostly European news 
(with the addition of the United States). Until 1950, Euro-
pean affairs dominated La Nación’s front pages. Although 
there were scattered references to India or the civil war in 
China, Europe was still the center of the world as under-
stood by the Argentine daily. In editorials, references to 
Asia were rare until at least 1950.25 The Korean War al-
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tered this feature to some extent, but it did not cause a ma-
jor transformation in the newspaper’s perspective.
For La Nación, Europe was the keystone on which the 
international liberal order was laid. Its fall meant the end 
of that order. This is the reason why a threat to Europe 
was a threat to the world: “to help Europe is today a way 
of universal salvation” (LN, 26 September 1947). Many 
things happened in the world, but the most important 
events occurred in Europe: “Europe is a continent cov-
ered with painful wounds . . . . What is therefore, this 
enigma of Europe, which constituted the enigma of uni-
versal peace?” (LN, 12 September 1948).
The defense of European empires was a defense of 
countries that, according to La Nación, were fighting for 
humanity against communism. This was a battle for hu-
manity, and humanity meant the collective of human be-
ings as well as a way of being civilized. Several editorials 
underlined these ideas. To defend Europe was “an una-
voidable moral obligation for the Christian civilization” 
(LN, 26 September 1947) and “this is a crusade launched 
in defense of the basis of our civilization and Latin Amer-
ican peoples have to participate” (LN, 21 December 
1947). As in many battles about civilization, religious 
language appeared (e.g., “Christian civilization” and 
“crusade”), but this does not mean that religion was the 
crux of the matter.26
Actually, civilization as conceived by La Nación re-
fers to the values of the nineteenth-century liberal-con-
servative ideology, which had constituted the daily’s phil-
osophical roots from the time of its inception. As was 
mentioned in the introduction, the concept of totalitarian-
ism offered a simplified interpretation of a complex reali-
ty in a moment of rapid and uncertain change. This su-
preme act of simplification reduced conflicts to 
manifestations of a cultural clash (frequently between 
two worlds). Also in the United States the Cold War was 
portrayed as a struggle for the salvation of Western val-
ues, in particular those represented by the US itself. In the 
case of La Nación, the defense of Europe was a defense 
of a representation of Western values. Soviet communism 
was the other. This view appeared clearly in the newspa-
per’s comments on the Paris Conference (which estab-
lished the basis for the Marshall Plan):
The Oriental interests, in their apparent recent form, 
have begun to move in Europe with a vigor unknown 
before the last war. In other moments of history, these 
interests acted in search of their own westernization [oc-
cidentalización]; today [there is] the intent to extend 
over Europe with the aim of orientalizing it [oriental-
izarla] . . . . This venerable civilizing continent cannot 
renounce to its destination or declare to be defeated . . . . 
To win this battle it has the cooperation of the United 
States and the willingness of nations that, like ours, are 
branches of the same tree and [an] advance party of the 
same civilization (LN, 13 July 1947).
State interferences that submitted human beings to the 
total surveillance of the state were “an aberration, a step 
backward to the old monarchies of the East” (LN, 12 Oc-
tober 1947). Communist victory could not be conceived 
from a moral and civilized point of view. During the Ko-
rean War, once Chinese intervention became apparent, La 
Nación did not hesitate to label communist troops as 
“Asian hordes” (LN, 17 December 1950).
This view, which equates totalitarianism with Asian 
barbarism or despotism, helps us understand the scarce 
sympathy the daily expressed for Asian independence 
movements. It also reflects the virulence of opposition 
against Perón. Still, ideological tropes are only a part of 
the story. The journalists working for La Nación (like 
most actors involved in the global Cold War) understood 
that every conflict involves other aspects such as strategy, 
alliances, and conjunctures. Thus, in 1951, when La 
Nación attempted to appease Perón’s government, its at-
titude toward decolonization shifted and a new, more 
“Third Worldist” position emerged (Sidicaro, 1993: 231). 
After that, tensions in Korea diminished and the Cold 
War slowly advanced toward an initial period of equilib-
rium and détente.
FINAL REMARKS
The understanding of the Cold War as a conflict be-
tween civilizations appeared in many other places and 
moments during the period. Thus, among the most con-
servative sectors of Latin American societies or among 
military men, the idea that Western civilization was col-
lapsing extended beyond the Cuban Revolution (Brands, 
2010: 27). Yet this view had already emerged before the 
Cuban events in many parts of the continent and such 
opinions were not necessarily the result of US influence. 
In Brazil, opposition to Getúlio Vargas, which was de-
feated in the 1945 elections, put communists, fascists, 
and Vargas supporters under the same umbrella as a part 
of totalitarian expression (Bohoslavsky, 2011). In Argen-
tina, this view was the result of the bitterness of the con-
flict between Peronism and its enemies. When the conflict 
reached its critical stage, the actors tended to consider it 
irresoluble and to think about it in cultural terms. That is, 
the conflict was the unavoidable result of “who we are” 
and “who they are,” which in turn made it more difficult 
to find a solution. As this article has shown, for La 
Nación, Peronism embodied the totalitarian other. The 
widespread use of the word totalitarianism to implicitly 
refer to Perón’s political movement was a result both of 
its relevance to the international arena and of the growing 
intensity of the domestic Argentine fracture. In fact, La 
Nación elaborated a multilayered concept of totalitarian-
ism in which domestic and international issued 
interacted.
Moreover, La Nación drew on diverse ideological tra-
ditions in order to construct its definition of totalitarian-
ism. Some had their roots in the nineteenth-century liber-
al-conservative credo. Others were more recent and were 
linked to the wide “progressive” coalitions that had been 
built against fascism during the interwar period in Europe 
and were then replicated in several parts of Latin Ameri-
ca. It has to be noted that La Nación blended conservative 
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and progressive arguments in its discussion of interna-
tional affairs mainly when it intended to implicitly refer 
to domestic policies. In a well-known article, Leslie 
Bethell and Ian Roxborough (1988) provide a fine analy-
sis of the “conjuncture” of the years 1946–1948 in Latin 
America. They observed how the end of World War II 
motivated a process of mobilization against authoritarian 
regimes and the success of social and political democrati-
zation in many parts of Latin America, and how the con-
vergence between the initial tensions of the Cold War and 
the reaction of traditional elites in Latin America wrecked 
any hopes for transformation (Bethell and Roxborough, 
1988). The peculiarity of the Argentine case (and proba-
bly of the Brazilian case as well) was that the process of 
social democratization was propelled forward by the in-
heritor of the authoritarian regime himself. This made La 
Nación a democratic and conservative critic at the same 
time.
Beginning in 1951, La Nación tried to establish 
friendlier terms with the government. Up until then, the 
newspaper and many of its readers had put significant 
weight on simplified cultural interpretation of the many 
conflicts that divided Argentine society and the world. It 
has been shown that the newspaper’s view on world af-
fairs and its analysis of domestic issues created a feed-
back loop.
NOTES
 1. See Escudé (1983) for an important contribution to the interna-
tional dimensions of Argentine domestic policies at the begin-
ning of the Cold War.
 2. This is the perspective of Grandin and Joseph (2010).
 3. This article is based on the editorials and articles that appeared 
in La Nación between 1946 and 1950. Unfortunately, I could 
not find relevant archival material for this essay. Nonetheless, 
La Nación’s editorials and opinion pieces constitute an ex-
tremely rich source for the analysis of the daily newspaper’s 
political strategies. On La Nación’s editorials, see Sidicaro 
(1993: 8-9).
 4. See the interesting reflections on this topic in Rabinbach (2006). 
The Italian case was the key for the conceptualization of totali-
tarianism; refer to Prezioso (2008). And for more about Euro-
pean influence on the debate in the United States, see Adler and 
Paterson (1970: 1047).
 5. See a good analysis of this process in Torre (2002: 14-23).
 6. La Nación’s position was shared by most Argentine newspa-
pers, among them, La Prensa. For some comparisons, see Aj-
mechet (2011) and Nallim (2009).
 7. However, the communists changed the strategy and tried to 
woo the Peronist working classes (James, 2006: 26).
 8. Stephanson (2000) has emphasized this discursive dichotomy 
as being key for understanding the Cold War. Nonetheless, his 
account is too idealistic, not allowing room for ideological 
modification and being unable to explain the timing of various 
political actions. In Stephanson’s view, the Cold War was an 
unavoidable result of permanent features in US ideology.
 9. On the issue of the Labour Party’s policies in Britain, see also 
the articles: “La pendiente colectivista” (14 August 1950) and 
“La experiencia del estatismo británico” (5 October 1950).
10. At the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947, US concerns 
about Western European social and economic conditions dra-
matically increased and were entangled with the perception of a 
communist threat on the American continent (Leffler, 2010: 
74-75).
11. On strikes in Italy, see “La población y las huelgas” (14 No-
vember 1948) and several articles published on December 19th 
concerning various strikes in Italy and a strike of bakeries in 
Argentina.
12. See also “Resurrecciones inquietantes” (12 October 1947).
13. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945V09, 
835.918/1-1145. The Chargé in Argentina (Edward Reed) to the 
Secretary of State, “Attitude of the United States toward Argen-
tine Censorship of the Press and Treatment of Press Representa-
tives,” Buenos Aires, 11 January 1945: 505. [Accesed 14/
March/2015]
14. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1950v02, 
611.35/5-150. Memorandum by the Secretary of State (Dean 
Acheson) to the President, Washington, May 1, 1950, Confiden-
tial. Effects on Brazil of Argentine Developments and Signifi-
cance to Brazilian-American Relations of Possible Election of 
Vargas to Presidency: 713. [Accessed 13/March/2015] 
15. Beginning in 1938, the US Department of State created institu-
tions aimed at influencing cultural discussions in Latin Ameri-
ca, but the Cold War propaganda did not fully explode until the 
Cuban Revolution. See Ninkovich (1981: 28) and Rodríguez 
(2012).
16. See “Atropello de fin de año” (LN, 31 December 1950) and 
“Nada de adversarios” (LN, 4 February 1951).
17. See also 24 October 1950.
18. Nevertheless, Mariano Plotkin states, in his insightful and de-
tailed study of this topic, that it is difficult to establish whether 
the texto único was employed in schools (Plotkin, 1993: 174).
19. In the Argentine case, the emphasis of some nationalist sectors 
close to Perón on rescuing the figure of Juan Manuel Rosas was 
harshly criticized by La Nación (LN, 17 January 1951). None-
theless, the relationship between nationalists and Perón was 
rather complex. See Walter (2001).
20. See “El comunismo en América”, published on February 8th, 
1950, a particularly paranoid article on this matter.
21. In its note, the union stated: “La Nación, a paper forged in the 
same furnace as La Prensa, has forgotten the proverb ‘fore-
warned is forearmed’” (LN, 10 February 1951). When Perón’s 
government ordered the shutdown of La Prensa, it took advan-
tage of an opportunity provided by a conflict between the union 
and the newspaper. Furthermore, the closing of newspapers 
multiplied in those months and it was impossible not to hear a 
threatening sentiment in the union’s words.
22. The impact of Wilson’s ideas on the colonial world has been 
explored by Manela (2007). The ideological influence of Wil-
son in Latin America deserves further analysis.
23. In 1920, the Argentine representative at the Assembly of the 
League of Nations proposed to keep colonial countries under 
the surveillance of the League in order to help them fully ma-
ture before becoming independent nations. See Archivo del 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y 
Culto (Argentina), Liga de las Naciones, Caja AH/0021 c. 67, 
A.12. “Projet de Voeu déposé par la Délégation Argentine,” Gé-
néve, s/f.
24. On the complex reasons for the Argentine decision, see Paradi-
so (2002: 553). La Nación’s position can be found in 22 Janu-
ary 1951.
25. Concerning the first editorials about Asia in January 1950, see 
“La política occidental en China,” (LN, 4 January 1950: 4).
26. In the conflict with Perón’s government over education issues, 
La Nación supported the secular public school system as con-
ceived by nineteenth-century Argentine liberal politicians.
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